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Abstract: 
Locke's views on toleration and natural law have recently received a 
'reassessment' at the hands of John William Tate.  This article 
demonstrates some of the many and various ways in which Tate has 
mangled Locke's positions and misconstrued the views of interpreters of 
Locke (myself included) whose interpretations he finds uncongenial. It 
finds that there are no textual grounds for Tate's claims and invites readers 
to reassess whether and how far they ought to be taken seriously. 
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Natural Law, Judgement and Toleration in Locke 
 
 
John Tate has used the pages of this journal to renew the clamour he raised 
against the present writer in 2012 on the subject of natural law and toleration in 
Locke.  His article contains some things which are not new, and some things 
which are not true, and one regrets to say that these together comprise most of 
its key claims as stated by Tate himself.  
Tate asserts that emphasising natural law in Locke is ‘mistaken’ and that 
‘it misrepresents and distorts far more than it illuminates of his political 
philosophy’. It is ‘mistaken’ (i) because it is ‘based on a misreading of Locke’s 
position on natural law itself’ and (ii) because it neglects the ‘normative’ as well 
as ‘practical imperatives’ upon which Locke relied in moving from an early 
opposition to toleration in the texts printed as Two Tracts on Government to ‘the 
prescriptive conclusions of his later political writings’. What evidence is 
adduced in support of these assertions?  
Tate begins with Bou-Habib’s claim, attributed to Harris, that ‘it was 
Locke’s affirmation of natural law, in the wake of the Two Tracts, which allowed 
him to move beyond those texts and affirm toleration’. But, Tate notes 
triumphantly, this claim is based on ‘a fundamental error of chronology’, for 
‘natural law was something that Locke openly affirmed in the Two Tracts itself 
[sic], with all the normative commitment and prescriptive force which 
characterised his later invocations of it’. Quite so: this is the point Harris 
himself was making. His point was not that Locke suddenly became conscious 
of natural law in 1663/4, having been ignorant of it in 1660, but that in 1663/4 
he developed an account of the same adequate to be assured of just what it 
was—and what it was not—thus helping him out of the position he had 
occupied in 1660 and had sensed was weak in 1661 (See Harris 1998: 44-107, 
esp. 67-73, 93-105). If there is a fundamental error, it is one of understanding, 
not chronology, committed by Tate, not Harris. 
Tate then turns to my ‘view of natural law’ in Two Tracts and thereafter. 
Stanton [he states] believes that from 1663/4 Locke shifted to seeing natural law 
as an external source of divine direction. Because its contents could be known 
with certainty by human reason, all human agents were now able ‘to agree on 
appropriate limits within civil society, concerning liberty and authority’, and to 
know with certainty when these limits were being breached. (I said no such 
thing, for reasons that will become apparent).  But Stanton does not see that 
Locke explicitly denied that natural law was ‘legislated by conscience’ in Two 
Tracts and fails to understand that it cannot by any means provide adequate 
direction to all. Natural law is a source of ‘conflict rather than “harmony”’ (not 
a term I ever used in this connexion). Dispute is inevitable because some 
individuals ‘are less conscientious in their use of reason (a question-begging 
phrase) or are swayed by interest and appetite in their interpretation of natural 
law’ and there is no agreed judge capable of settling this dispute because the 
law is unwritten. Besides which, Locke’s natural law contains what Gerald 
Dworkin termed non-neutral principles—principles which would be endorsed 
Page 1 of 8
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/EJPT
European Journal of Political Theory
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
 
by all at the level of general principle but necessarily generate contention when 
applied to particular cases. Accordingly it is ‘of no use in the practical 
management of political authority, or the reconciliation of individual liberties 
with that authority’.  Stanton, he repeats, misses all these points (Tate 2015: 3-6). 
Let me address them in turn. 
Tate’s assertion that I fail to see that Locke explicitly denied that natural 
law was ‘legislated by conscience’ is puzzling, because I state that Locke 
‘discussed conscience under the rubric of private law’, not natural law, in an 
essay to which Tate proffered a ‘Response’ (Stanton 2011: 17; Tate 2012 and see 
Stanton 2012). Indeed I found it relatively easy to see: I simply read what Locke 
wrote.  What is harder to see—what, as I take it, Locke saw even if Tate 
cannot—is that this position was difficult to accommodate stably within the 
nexus of ideas bequeathed to him by his predecessors. 
Conscience, they agreed, provided direction in matters of external 
practice. The importance of this direction lay in its specifying the acceptability 
to God of particular actions. The difficulty is that the notion that conscience 
provides direction is ambiguous between providing laws and providing 
judgements about them.  This difficulty is evident in Robert Sanderson, whose 
arguments Locke used in Two Tracts, who wrote of people having ‘right reason, 
imprinted in their hearts… which is as truly the Law and Word of God, as is 
that which printed in our Bibles’ (Sanderson 1663: 64). The effect of this position 
is to elide reason, law, and judgement so that, as Samuel Parker later put it, 
‘whatsoever some men affirm or fancy to be written upon their Hearts… may 
be as wildly pleaded in all cases [for] Principles of natural Reason and 
Conscience, as the Spirit of God has been’ (Parker 1681: 5). For Parker, this 
notion of right reason was of a piece with the Quaker doctrine of the inner light. 
Locke seems to have agreed.1 Writing to a correspondent in 1659, he had 
observed,  
 
’tis Phansye that rules us all under the title of reason…every one 
thinkes he alone imbraces this Juno, whilst others graspe noething 
but clouds, we are all Quakers here and there is not a man but thinks 
he alone hath this light within and all besids stumble in the darke, 
 
adding that ‘every ones Recta ratio is but the traverses of his owne steps’ (Locke 
1976-, i: 123).  God, it seemed, had not been so sparing to men as to give them 
principles of natural law and left it to Professor Dworkin to make them non-
neutral. 
 Locke’s response to this difficulty was to disambiguate reason, law, and 
                                                
1 One of the many merits of Harris’s treatment of these matters is that it offers an explanation of 
how Locke came to recognise and attempted to address this problem.  To suggest that his 
position reduces to the view that Locke’s ‘personal experience’ of the Quakers was decisive 
(Tate 2015: 2) is to miss the point entirely.  The Quakers brought to light a profound difficulty 
with the scholastic conceptions Locke had inherited.  See (Locke 1976-, i: 17): ‘Aristotle and 
Scotus cannot secure us from lys and deceivers whereof we have an other experiment in the 
quakers’. 
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judgement.  Part of this response was to treat natural law not as innate 
principles but rather as an external source of direction, cognoscible via sense 
and reason. Tate apparently thinks that the empiricist thesis that knowledge of 
natural law is in principle available to all by this route commits me to the thesis 
that such knowledge eo ipso terminates all disagreement and discord. But this is 
an absurd non sequitur that comes from his having confused what Locke, from 
1663/4 onwards, was careful to distinguish. In Essays on the Law of Nature Locke 
states that the fact that rational agents disagree indicates that they all suppose a 
law but differ in what it prescribes on any given occasion. For ‘if there were no 
law of nature which reason declares we must show ourselves obedient to, how 
does it come to pass that the conscience of people who recognize the precepts of 
no other law whereby they are either guided or bound in duty, nevertheless 
passes judgement upon their life and conduct and either acquits or declares 
guilty…seeing that without some law no judgement can be pronounced?’ 
(Locke 1954: 115, 117).  So there is law, and there is judgement.   
 Reason and sense disclose this law, its content, and its binding force. Its 
injunctions, as I wrote, require actions of one sort rather than another—dutiful 
actions.  Tate interprets this (and similar statements from Harris) as a claim that 
natural law discloses with finality what is to be done on every occasion, 
presumably because I state that reason ‘discovers’ and ‘discloses’ our duties 
under natural law and that reason is ‘univocal’ and ‘infallible’ (Tate 2015: 4). 
But in the transition from general duties to the particular actions required to 
fulfil them there is obviously a gap. The injunction to preserve oneself is one 
thing—a duty in natural law—but identifying which particular actions are 
requisite to fulfil the duty requires something more, which includes attention to 
the situation in which one finds oneself. The ‘something more’ is judgement.2   
 The model of conscience Locke had inherited ran law and judgement 
together.3 Locke found it necessary to distinguish the two emphatically. Thus 
he would insist that ‘Conscience is not ye law of Nature but judging by yt wch is 
taken to be ye law’, that ‘conscience dictates not but acquits and condemns 
upon the dictates of a superior power’ and that those dictates were not 
imprinted in the mind but acquired from without ([Anon] 1699: 5, 10, 11).4 
Judging is the mind’s way of bridging the gap between the general and the 
particular by ‘putting Ideas together…where their certain Agreement or 
Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed’ (Locke 1975: 653).  Judgement, 
even right judgement, is thus to be contrasted with demonstration, in which the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas is ‘plainly and clearly perceived’ and there 
is ‘Knowledge’ (Locke 1975: 532).  The point made by Harris and myself was that 
Locke treats natural law as an object of knowledge.  
 It follows that ‘we are always in a position to understand this law and its 
                                                
2 See e.g. Tate (2015: 12, note 2) for incomprehension of this difference.  
3 See Sanderson (1660: 32, 29), for conscience as law written in the heart (Notiones et ipsius 
Naturae dictamine cordibus humanis inscriptae), and judge of particular actions (Actus particulares 
Proprii). 
4  Notes transcribed from Locke’s copy, held at Yale University, Beinecke Rare Book and 
Manuscript Library, call number K8 L79 Zz 697 Pb. Authorship of this anonymous work 
traditionally has been attributed to Thomas Burnet. 
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requirements’, that natural law ‘speaks universally’, that its contents can be 
known with ‘certainty’, and that we are ‘able to evaluate our political 
society…and to identify subsequently instances of power without right’ (Tate 
2015: 4, my emphasis), for, as Locke says, ‘without some law no judgement can 
be pronounced’. Nowhere did I say that judgement was unnecessary—on the 
contrary its necessity is implicit in what I said. But I was concerned with 
something else.  Nothing in what I said ‘requires that we know, indubitably, 
when ‘God’s fixed purposes’ have been violated’ (Tate 2015: 12, note 8).5 That is 
a matter of judgement, not knowledge, and judgement, unlike knowledge, 
admits of great variety about the same matter. Nothing in what I said is 
inconsistent with my declaration that God alone possesses knowledge in the 
matter (ibid), for God is omniscient (Locke 1975: 621).  Readers will, I hope, 
agree that human beings are not. But they must judge.   
 I shall not linger long on the claim that the ‘unwritten’ character of 
natural law ‘explains’ the widespread disagreement about it that Locke 
observes. I merely point out that the same disagreement may be observed about 
written law.  Or perhaps Tate has ‘failed to see’ what Locke and Bagshaw were 
disagreeing about? 
  So much for Tate’s assertion that Locke’s position on natural law has 
been misread. What of his claim that the ‘normative and practical imperatives’ 
on which Locke relied have been overlooked?   
 Tate’s position is that in Locke’s later writings ‘the ‘people’ ‘consent’ to 
the magistrate’s authority being exercised for a limited range of ends’, which 
includes ‘the necessity of the state’ and ‘the welfare of the people’ but excludes 
‘the religious practice of the individual’. Tate does not explain why. Their 
consent is expressed through a contract which Tate represents as ‘a new 
normative source that Locke affirms in the wake of the Two Tracts’.  Natural 
law, Tate concedes, does ‘authorise’ this process, ‘it being from God, Locke 
declares, that individuals derive their entitlement to transfer some of their 
natural rights…to government’, but ‘otherwise’—how was the theatre 
otherwise, Mrs. Lincoln? —‘the process arises by ‘the contrivance and 
appointment of men alone’’ (Tate 2015: 8).  Tate takes it to follow that contract, 
not natural law, is the ‘normative instrument’ of Locke’s preference.  
 It further follows, on Tate’s account, that Locke’s position is unstable, 
because the ‘practical imperative’ of civil peace is potentially at odds with the 
extensive individual liberty Locke valorizes: ‘[t]heir respective limits, 
concerning individual liberty (on the one hand) and the scope of governance 
necessary for civil peace (on the other) are determined by practical political 
negotiation between competing parties’ which means, in the final analysis, by 
force (Tate 2015: 10, compare paragraphs 1 and 3).  Contrary to Bou-Habib, 
Harris and Stanton, he concludes, ‘they are not determined by natural law’ 
(Tate 2015:10-11).6 
                                                
5 For recognition of the need for judgment in this situation, and interesting discussion, see 
Nacol (2011). 
6 This is Tate’s phrase, not Harris’s or my own, and, one might add, the meaning of it is far from 
obvious: determined how? 
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 All of this is belied by Tate’s own statement that natural law is delivered 
to men by God (Tate 2015: 4). For natural law is a normative code which is 
superior to every human being and human government alike, and which 
contains duties that regulate aspects of life beyond the scope of the latter, 
requiring the love and worship of God, the preservation of others, and of 
oneself (Locke 1954: 156-58). The question then becomes, how best to produce 
the ends in view—to worship God and to secure terrestrial survival? The 
answer is that the rational means include institutions, as, for instance, religious 
society and civil society. The ends in view for each of these societies are 
prescribed by natural law, they being its vehicles.  A religious society is a 
society of people combining in order to worship God publicly in the way they 
judge to be acceptable to Him to the end of their salvation (Locke 1968: 71). A 
civil society is a society of people constituted solely (solummodo) for the end of 
conserving and promoting civil goods (Locke 1968: 64/65). Both are defined by 
Locke in terms of an end, and an end wholly different in content from the other. 
 These definitions are inferences from natural law. Natural law implies 
the abilities to understand and to will it. By inference, these abilities reach 
recognition of means to the ends of natural law and voluntary adherence to 
those means. Thus Locke’s definition of a church includes the fact that people 
combine sua sponte to worship for the end of their salvation: the exercise of will 
is implied in the definition, and declared in the ensuing paragraph where a 
church is termed ‘a free and voluntary society’ (Locke 1968: 71). Likewise civil 
society is a product of will and agreement, as men consent to unite with others 
‘to make one Body Politick’ (Locke 1988: 332). People originate both religious 
and civil society as institutions for their ends, and in this respect the origins of 
both are found in human will.  
 This is a supposition of natural law thinking, not an alternative to it.  The 
ends for which those societies are brought into existence are ends in natural 
law, and they are limited to the pursuit of those ends.7 Nowhere did I deny that 
these societies originate in consent (Locke says they do). But that is a causal 
claim, not a normative one.8  My point was that ‘the contrivance and 
appointment of men alone’ is not what determines those ends or makes them 
authoritative in relation to human beings.  Still less could the consent of human 
beings substitute other ends in their place. Tate seems oblivious to the fact that 
in conceding that natural law ‘authorises’ what human beings can legitimately 
consent to he concedes the case entire.  
 One must add that the idea that individual liberty is a normative 
imperative has no textual support in Locke. Locke’s Epistola tells us that men 
have liberty in religion in order to worship God in the way they judge will be 
pleasing to him (Locke 1968: 103).9 It figures as a means to a divinely instituted 
                                                
7 In Locke’s words, the ‘boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable’ (Locke 1968: 85-87). 
8 For wider discussion of lockean causality as it bears on this point, see Harris (2007).  I am 
afraid that it is not entirely clear to me what Tate means by the phrase ‘normative imperative’. 
9 Hence Locke’s asseveration that in religion man (homo, all human beings) ‘must be left to 
himself and his own conscience’ (1968: 101)—that is to say, his [or her] own judgement of how 
to fulfil the duty to worship God publicly. 
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end, relating not to whether one worships but how. In Two Treatises of 
Government people are likewise said to possess the degree of liberty proper to 
beings bounded by the law of nature (1988: 269), which is again to identify a 
means to ends that that law specifies rather than an end in itself. It is precisely 
because Locke regards it in these terms, as a necessary means to the 
performance of certain duties under natural law, whether to preserve ourselves 
and others or to worship God publicly, that he so often speaks of these liberties 
as rights, and why he declares, as Tate admits, that people cannot do whatever 
they like with those rights. For rights are powers coordinated to ends, and the 
ends in view are ends in natural law. The idea that liberty per se might be ‘a 
normative imperative’ does not seem to be coherent anyway, though one sees 
that the exercise or protection of liberty might be.  
 Tate declares that in Two Tracts this is ‘a liberty which exists in the 
inward realm of individual conscience alone’, which by the time of the ‘Essay 
concerning Toleration’ has expanded ‘to include outward expression as well as 
inner conscience’. This is false. Locke’s position is that people can give up their 
liberty of action in indifferent things to the civil magistrate in a contract but (as 
one might expect someone who ‘affirmed natural law’ to argue) they cannot 
give up the liberty to perform duties derived from divine laws, including the 
duty to worship God publicly (Locke 1967: 126).10 So liberty is not, in fact, being 
confined to the ‘inward realm of conscience alone’. The operative distinction is 
between indifferent things, in which people are not bound by divine laws, and 
necessary ones, in which they are, and the issue is which beliefs and actions fall 
into which category. As Locke states plainly, people ‘never had the liberty to 
give up to another’s injunctions’ (Locke 1967: 130) the power to do or omit what 
is necessary in religion, and this extends beyond inner belief to outward 
expression as much in Two Tracts as in Locke’s later writings.11 To say that the 
‘inclusion of outward religious expression’ moves Locke’s argument ‘beyond 
the Two Tracts’ (Tate 2015: 8) is to commit two blunders in one. 
 What of ‘the imperative of civil peace’ Tate d scerns in Locke? The end of 
civil society, the preservation of life and civil goods, and by inference the 
commonwealth itself, is an end in natural law, and civil society being ‘a State of 
Peace, amongst those who are of it’, civil peace is upholding the end by abiding 
by the terms of this society (Locke 1988: 407). The end is non-negotiable. 
‘Practical political negotiation between competing parties’ ‘determines’ neither 
                                                
10 Recall Dr. Tate’s observation that ‘natural law was something that Locke openly affirmed in 
the Two Tracts itself, with all the normative commitment and prescriptive force which 
characterised his later Essays on the Law of Nature’ (Tate 2015: 4). 
11 A point which escapes the chronological vigilance upon which Dr. Tate earlier prides himself: 
see Locke (1967: 214-15): ‘The outward acts of religion are also called ‘divine worship’.  Since 
God ordained that man should be composed of body as well as soul…he demands those 
outward performances by which that inner worship of the spirit is expressed…[by which] 
we…bear witness here and now to the love, faith, and obedience of the soul[;] and 
this…worship…is everywhere ordained by God in his law, and…we are bound to fulfil [it], nor 
does the magistrate possess any right over this worship since it can be altered by none but the 
Divine Lawgiver himself’. 
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the end in view nor the legitimate scope of means to it.12  If Tate’s point is 
merely that, in practice, human beings sometimes breach those terms, or that, 
when they confront one another, the stronger often prevails, whoever denied it? 
Not me. Not Locke, for whom ‘Polyphemus’s Den gives us a perfect Pattern of 
such a Peace’ (Locke 1988: 417). But ‘the question here is about the rule of right 
action, not the outcome of doubtful cases’ (Locke 1968: 131).  The question is 
whether emphasising natural law in Locke is ‘mistaken’ and whether ‘it 
misrepresents and distorts far more than it illuminates of his political 
philosophy’. 
The answer to which one is obliged to come is that it is Tate who 
misconstrues and mistakes Locke’s positions, that his own claims misrepresent 
and distort not only the positions he takes himself to be attacking but also 
Locke’s political philosophy, early and late, that he ‘fails to account for key 
elements of Locke’s political philosophy, as well as some of its main outcomes’, 
that it is his own p sition, and his own reasoning, that ‘lacks cogency’ (Tate 
2015: 10, 2). The ‘mistakes’, ‘errors’, and ‘inaccuracy’ of which Tate speaks so 
liberally are, I am afraid, his own. 
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